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ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER: 
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF PERCEPTIONS, POLICY, AND 
THE LAW 
by Todd A. DeMitchelf* & Vincent J. Connelly** 
The academic freedom of professors and teachers is much discussed, 
but its borders remain stubbornly indistinct and blurred. It is a 
constitutional right claimed by educators in schools and colleges but not 
consistently proclaimed by the courts. The courts' view of academic 
freedom impacts policy-making and practice, yet the impact is 
inconsistent and not easily discerned. 1 An educator's professional 
practice in both higher education and public education is often predicated 
upon their perception of the robustness or weakness of their right to 
academic freedom2 thus influencing collective bargaining agreements 
and board policies. 
Despite academic freedom's influence on policy, there is no black 
letter law definition of this right. Adding to the vagueness of the 
situation, professors, lawyers, and judges "are not always clear whose 
academic freedom is at stake."3 For example, an analysis by noted 
expert, Professor Perry A. Zirkel, finds academic freedom as a 
"negligible protection afforded to individual faculty members."4 A 
'Todd A. DeMitchell, Professor, Department of Education & Justice Studies Pro gam, University of 
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University of New Hampshire, Durham, New Hampshire. B.A., Loyola College Maryland; M.Ed., 
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I. Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547, 553 (5th Cir. 1982). 
2. See JERRY HERMAN & GENE MEGIVERON, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION: 
WIN/WIN, WIN/LOSE, LosE/LOSE 190-94 (1993) (citing academic freedom as an important initial 
contract article): Todd A. DeMitchell & Casey D. Cobb, Teachers.· Their Union and Their 
Profession, 212 EDUC. L. REP. I (2006). 
3. Robert M. O'Neil, Academic Freedom and the Constitution, II J.C. & U.L. 275, 281 
(1984). 
4. Perry A. Zirkel, Academic Freedom of Individual Faculty Members, 47 EDUC. LAW REP. 
809, 824 (1988) ("The results of this analysis are sobering for the faculty members in higher 
education who might drink too deeply of the bottle labeled 'academic freedom' as a euphoric cure 
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federal district court also highlighted this disconnect when it wrote: "The 
concept of academic freedom ... is more clearly established in academic 
literature than it is in the courts." 5 
While the Supreme Court has stated that academic freedom is a 
"special concern of the First Amendment,"6 it has yet to "articulate a 
coherent analytical framework for protecting that concern." 7 The Court's 
pronouncements on academic freedom are majestic but not very helpful 
in establishing a definition. 8 Consequently, a case analysis reveals its 
tenuous rather than robust support of academic freedom. 9 
Despite this, those advocating a robust view of the right to academic 
freedom often refer to the Supreme Court's majestic language in 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents: "Our Nation is deeply committed to 
safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendental value to us 
10 
all and not merely to the teachers concerned." The Court further stated 
that the First Amendment "does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of 
orthodoxy over the classroom" and that a professor's academic freedom 
is a "special concern of the First Amendment." 11 
It is clear from education case law and history that the genesis of 
academic freedom is found in higher education. 12 However, public 
for various problems with colleagues, administrators, and external government agencies."). 
5. Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley Coli., 883 F.Supp. 1407, 1412 (C.D. Calif. 1995); see 
also Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The precise contours of the 
concept of academic freedom are difficult to define."); Mahoney v. Hankin, 593 F.Supp. 1171, 1174 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (recognizing that the contours of academic freedom "are not well-defined, 
especially with regard to a teacher's speech within the classroom."). 
6. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
7. Recent Case, Fourth Circuit Upholds Virginia Statute Prohibiting Employcl's ji-om 
Downloading Sexually Explicit Material, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1414 (2001 ). 
8. See 1. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A Special Concern ol the First Amendment, 99 
YALE L.J. 251,253 (1989) ("The problems are fundamental: There has been no adequate analysis of 
what academic freedom the Constitution protects or of why it protects it. Lacking definition or 
guiding principle, the principle floats in the law, picking up decisions as a hull does barnacles."); W. 
Stuart Stuller, High School Academic Freedom: The Evolution ola Fish out of Water, 77 NlB. L. 
REV. 301, 302 (1998) ("Despite the tributes, courts are remarkably consistent in their unwillingness 
to give analytical shape to the rhetoric of academic freedom."). 
9. Many of the early Supreme Court pronouncements cited as support for academic freedom 
were not part of the majority decisions. Therefore, they lacked precedential value. For example, 
Justice Douglas' comment about loyalty oaths casting a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom-
"There can be no real academic freedom in that environment"-was a dissenting opinion and 
consequently carries no weight in law. Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 510 (1952) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
10. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603. 
11. !d. 
12. See WILLIAM D. VALENTE & CHRISTINA M. VALENTE, LAW IN THE SCHOOLS 147 (4th 
ed. 1998) ("Suggestions of a legal right to academic freedom first appeared in higher education 
cases .... "). 
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school teachers bring the majority of cases. 13 By doing so, they add to 
the uncertainty of and confusion over the contours of academic freedom 
by asking the question: "To whom does it belong?" 14 
This study will use the following questions to focus and frame this 
study of academic freedom: 
1. Is there a legal basis for academic freedom for public school 
teachers? 
2. What are the perceptions of public school teachers regarding their 
academic freedom rights? 
This research uses a mixed methodology including legal and 
quantitative analysis designed to address these questions. While this 
methodological approach is fairly new, Stefkovich and Torres have noted 
that it is "strongly supported by the education law community." 15 
Furthermore, Schimmel advocated the use of complementary methods as 
a means of adding depth and texture to legal research. 16 This 
methodology is employed in two phases, beginning with a legal analysis 
of cases and secondary sources and followed by the development of the 
research instrument, data gathering, and analysis. 17 
The paper consists of five parts. Part one will discuss the historical 
roots of academic freedom. Part two will review the major Supreme 
Court decisions on academic freedom. The third part will discuss 
13. See Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers' Classroom Speech and the First 
Amendment, 30 J.L. & Eouc. I (2001 ); Kara Lynn Grice, Striking an Unequal Balance: The Fourth 
Circuit Holds that Public School Teachers Do Not Have First Amendment Rights to Set Curricula in 
Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1960 (1999); Donna Prokop, 
Contrm·ersial Teacher Speech: Striking a Balance Between First Amendment Rights and 
Educational Interests, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2533 (1993); Merle H. Weiner, Dirty Words in the 
Classroom: Teaching the Limits of' the First Amendment, 66 TENN. L. REV. 597 (1999); Perry A. 
Zirkel, Boring or Bunkum?, 79 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 791 (1998). 
14. Julius Getman & Jacqueline W. Mintz, Foreward: Academic Freedom in a Changing 
Society, 66 TEX L. REV. 1247, 1249 (1988). See JOSEPH BECKHAM ET AL., CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 
IN HIGHER EDUCATION LAW 116 (Joseph Beckham & David Dagley eds., 2005) ("Since academic 
freedom involves the right of the institution and its representatives to function with reasonable 
independence from government interference, one might presume that the doctrine would enable a 
public institution to assert its prerogatives as a government employer and reasonably restrict the free 
speech of employees .... On the other hand, the doctrine as applied to faculty rights would appear to 
free individual faculty from interference by administrators or others within the academy. In dealing 
with this paradox, courts have elected to regard academic freedom as a special concern of the First 
Amendment and not an independent, fundamental right."). 
15. Jacqueline A. Stefkovich & Mario S. Torres, Jr., The Demographics of Justice: Student 
Searches, Student Rights, and Administrator Practice, 39 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 259, 263 (2003). 
16. RESEARCH THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE: COMPLIMENTARY METHODS FOR EXAMINING 
LEGAL ISSUES IN EDUCATION 1-2 (David Schimmel ed., 1996). 
17. !d. For a discussion of quantitative analysis and legal analysis, see Michael Heise, The 
Past, Present, and Future of' Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New 
Empiricism, 2002 U.lLL. L. REV. 819. 
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academic freedom in public schools. Part four will discuss survey data 
addressing the perceptions of public school teachers regarding their 
rights to academic freedom. The last part is a conclusion. 
This research is exploratory and not meant to be exhaustive of the 
subject of academic freedom in public schools. It is intended to provoke 
a dialogue as to how courts view academic freedom and how public 
school teachers perceive and practice it in the classrooms. Hopefully, 
policymakers will use the data to assist in policy formation. 
I. ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A HISTORICAL VIEW 
Looking at history, the principle of academic freedom in America 
originated in higher education, but the emphasis developed much later 
than the rest of the academic world. While medieval universities had 
faculty guilds that shared power with student guilds, America's early 
institutions of higher education were characterized by legal control 
exercised by non-academic trustees. 18 The power relationship between 
faculty and lay trustees went virtually unchallenged until the latter half of 
the nineteenth century when Americans who had studied at German 
universities sought to remodel American universities in the German 
0 19 
rmage. 
The early American model emphasized passing on received wisdom 
to the next generation. America's "nineteenth century colleges were not 
the modem research institutions of today."20 However, many institutions 
responded to the Germanic influence br reconstituting themselves as 
centers of research and scholarship, 1 seeking new knowledge, 
particularly in the sciences. 22 The German idea of academic freedom 
"was premised upon the university as a self-governing body of faculty. 
By contrast, in America, "'the university' encompass[ed] a lay governing 
board and its administrative delegates to which the faculty [was] legally 
subordinate."23 This governance pattern shifted from a lay board 
dominated by clergy to a board consisting of business and financial 
18. Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions a/Academic Freedom in 
America, 66 TEx L. REV. 1265, 1278 ( 1988). 
19. !d. at 1269-71. 
20. Stuller, supra note 3, at 308. 
21. RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 386-87 ( 1955). 
22. Donald J. Weidner, Thoughts on Academic Freedom: Urofsky v. Gilmore, 33 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 257,259 (2001). 
23. Matthew W. Finkin, On "Institutional" Academic Freedom, 61 TEX. L. REV. 817, 846 
(1983). 
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leaders. 24 
Although some aspects of intellectual freedom embedded in 
academic freedom have their roots "in antiquity, the modem 
development of the doctrine of academic freedom is derived largely from 
the nineteenth century German concepts of lehrfreiheit and 
lernfreiheit. 25 Lehrfreiheit, or freedom to teach, included the notion that 
professors "should be free to conduct research and publish their findings 
without fear of reproof from church or state; it further denoted the 
authority to determine the content of courses and lectures."26 
Lernfreiheit was a parallel right of students to study and determine the 
course of studies for themselves. 27 
American higher education predated the ratification of the United 
States Constitution. However, the influence of the Germanic universities 
and their concept of lehrfreiheit did not impact American colleges and 
universities until almost one-hundred years after the ratification of the 
Constitution. In fact, academic freedom did not appear as an articulated 
concept in America until 1915.28 Surely, when the Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights were drafted the concern for academic freedom did not 
exist. 29 The question then becomes, when did it become a special 
concern ofthe Constitution?30 
Academic freedom as an aspect of a professor's employment 
surfaced at the national level in 1915 when a committee of the American 
Association of University Professors ("AAUP") issued a report on the 
24. Weidner, supra note 22, at 259. 
25. Stephen R. Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of' Public School Teachers to 
Determine What They Teach. 124 U. PENN. L. REV. 1293, 1299 (1976). 
26. HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 21 at 386-87. 
27. !d. 
28. See AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS I (9th ed. 2001) 
("From its inception in 1915, the main work of the Association has been in the area of academic 
freedom and tenure."). 
29. "The Bill of Rights or the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution define 
the relationship between citizen and the federal government." ROBERT M. HENDRICKSON, THE 
COLLEGES, THEIR CONSTITUTENCIES AND THE COURTS 4 (2d ed. 1999). Since the federal 
government did not run or control colleges, academic freedom could not have been a special concern 
of the First Amendment at the inception of the Bill of Rights. It wasn't until after the Civil War that 
the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment, was applied to the relationship of the state to the 
citizen through the Fourteenth Amendment. Also, consider the following from David M. Rabban, 
"Fitting academic freedom within the rubric of the first amendment is in many respects an extremely 
difficult challenge. The term 'academic freedom,' in obvious contrast to 'freedom of the press,' is 
nowhere mentioned in the text of the first amendment. It is inconceivable that those who debated and 
ratified the first amendment thought about academic freedom." David M. Rabban, A Functional 
Ana(vsis of "individual" and "Institutional" Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 237 ( 1990). 
30. Todd A. DeMitchell, Academic Freedom-·Whose Rights: The Individual's or the 
University's?, 168 EDUC L. REP. I, 3 (2002). 
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subject. 31 The Report adapted lehrfreiheit to the American university. 
The AAUP focused on the professor as a teacher and investigator who 
had the right to interpret and communicate his or her conclusions without 
being subject to interference, molestation, or penalty. 32 Despite the 
AAUP's approach to academic freedom, they did not use the First 
Amendment as justification. Instead, they chose to justify academic 
freedom "on the basis of its social utility as a means of advancing the 
search for truth."33 The 1915 AAUP principles were later codified in a 
1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure. 
How the AAUP defines academic freedom is important in 
understanding its normative, professional aspects, which may influence 
the legal construction of academic freedom. It should also be kept in 
mind that the AAUP definition of academic freedom applies equally to 
public and private institutions of higher education, even though the 
judicial application of academic freedom does not. Constitutional 
protections only apply to the relationship between government and the 
individual, therefore, the relationship between private institutions and 
individuals does not encompass those protections. 
The AAUP 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure along with its 1970 Interpretative Comments ("Comments") 34 
rests on the AAUP's Statement on Professional Ethics ("Statement"). 35 
In it, the AAUP asserted that academic freedom "carries with it duties 
correlative with rights." 36 While professional associations enforce ethics 
in law and medicine, the individual institution of hi~her education assure 
enforcement of ethics in the academic profession.- 7 According to the 
Statement, professors should: ( 1) be "guided by a deep conviction of the 
worth and dignity of the advancement of knowledge;" (2) "encourage the 
free pursuit of learning in their students;" (3) be obligated by a "common 
31. AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 28. 
32. See WALTER P. METZGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN TilE AGE OF THI' UNIVERSITY 123 
(1955) ('"It need scarcely be pointed out,' wrote the authors of the 1915 report, 'that the freedom 
which is the subject of this report is that of the teacher."'); /d. at 134-35 ("The professor can only be 
of use to the legislator and administrator if his conclusions are disinterested and his own."); AM. 
ASS'N OF UNIY. PROFESSORS, DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FR~JcDOM AND 
ACADEMIC TENURE (1915), reprinted in AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 28. at 300 
("It is, in short, not the absolute freedom of utterance of the individual scholar, but the absolute 
freedom of thought, of inquiry, of discussion and of teaching, of the academic profcisonal. that is 
asserted by this declaration of principles."). 
33. HOFST ADTER & METZGER, supra note 21, at 398-40. 
34. AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 28, at I. 
35. /d. 
36. AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 28, at 3. 
37. AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, STATEMENT ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1987)_ 
http://www.aaup.org/ AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/statementonprofessionalcthics.htm. 
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membership in the community of scholars;" (4) "seek above all to be 
effective teachers and scholars;" and (5) be subject to the same "rights 
and obligations of other citizens."38 
Academic freedom is cast within this mold of ethical behavior. 39 
Academic freedom, according to the Statement, embodies the "full 
freedom in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the 
adequate performance of [the professor's] other academic duties."40 It 
also includes professors' freedom to discuss their subject in the 
classroom with the warning that "they should be careful not to introduce 
into their teaching controversial matter which has no relation to their 
subject. "41 The Statement's emphasis that professors are citizens, 
members of a learned profession, and officers of an educational 
institution reinforces the mandate that "they should remember that the 
public may judge their profession and their institution by their 
42 
utterances." 
The 1940 Statement and the 1970 Interpretative Comments reinforce 
the proposition that professors work within an institutional environment; 
they are officers of the institution whose actions carry the imprimatur of 
the institution. For example, the protection of a professor's research and 
publication through academic freedom is predicated upon the "adequate 
performance of their other academic duties." 43 Thus, a professor's 
academic freedom is based on and subject to other responsibilities 
associated with employment. 44 This is further reinforced in the 
Statement on Professional Ethics in which the enforcement of ethical 
behavior is an institutional duty. 45 The statements from the AAUP tend 
to support an argument that individual academic freedom is subordinate 
to the employment relationship. This begs the question: Can academic 
freedom be a special concern of the First Amendment if it is subordinate 
to the employment relationship?46 
38. !d. 
39. See Keen v. Penson, 970 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing the University of Wisconsin-
Oshkosh's use of the AAUP's Code of Ethics in an academic freedom dispute over the assignment 
of grades). 
40. AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 28, at 3. 
41 !d. 
42. !d. at 4. 
43. !d. at 3. 
44. See Wirsing v. Bd. of Regents, 739 F.Supp. 551, 553 (D. Colo. 1990) ("Further, although 
Dr. Wirsing may have a constitutionally protected right under the First Amendment to disagree with 
the University's policies, she has no right to evidence her disagreement by failing to perform the 
duty imposed upon her as a condition of employment."); see also Shaw v. Bd. of Tmstees, 396 
F.Supp. 872 (D. Md. 1975), afj'd, 549 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1976). 
45. AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 28, at 134-35. 
46. DeMitchell, supra note 30, at 4. 
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Furthermore, according to the AAUP, academic freedom is 
contingent upon the professor meeting three requirements of the 
institution. These three points are predicated on the primacy of the 
employment relationship as opposed to the professional activity of 
teaching or conducting research. As already mentioned, professors meet 
the first of these requirements through "adequate performance of their 
other academic duties." 47 They meet the second requirement by serving 
as an officer of the institution, implying a greater relationship than just 
employee to employer. 48 These first two points pertain to employment in 
a public institution where the state acts as employer. Professors meet the 
third requirement by recognizing the need to disassociate speech as 
private citizens from speech as university professors. '+9 This 
disassociation tends to underscore that a different lens will be used for 
individual speech and university speech. Academic freedom may provide 
insulation from adverse employment decisions when the speech is 
extramural as opposed to speech as an employee of the university. 
When the professor speaks as a citizen the state acts as a sovereign. 
This relationship of citizen to sovereign is the same for all individuals 
regardless of their employment status. In this situation, the professor 
cannot claim that her or his speech is a special concern of the First 
Amendment because First Amendment protections are available to all. 50 
In other words, the state protection afforded a professor when speaking 
as a citizen is no different than the protection afforded a university 
custodian when speaking as a citizen. Further, this separation tends to 
underscore that an educational institution would distinguish between 
citizen and university speech. Therefore, the professor's academic free 
speech rights, according to the AAUP, are determined by the professor's 
adequate performance as an employee and the discharge of his or her 
duties as an officer of the institution. 
The discussion to this point has primarily centered on academic 
freedom as policy. It is without constitutional teeth, and only the courts 
can provide that clout. The next section reviews the major Supreme 
Court decisions, as well as significant lower court decisions that have 
formed the basis for debate. 
47. !d. at 3. 
48. !d. 
49. !d. 
50. AM. Ass'N Of UNJV. PROFESSORS, supra note 28. at 6 ("The controlling principle is that a 
faculty member's expression of opinion as a citizen cannot constitute grounds for dismissal unless it 
clearly demonstrates the faculty member's unfitness for his or her position. Extramural utterances 
rarely bear upon the faculty member's fitness for the position."). 
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II. THE COURTS AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
The Supreme Court's pronouncements on academic freedom are 
majestic but not very helpful in establishing a definition. In the classic 
academic freedom case, Sweezy v. New Hampshire, the Court established 
that: 
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities 
is almost self-evident. ... Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere 
of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain 
free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and 
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die51 
This language is similar to the Court's decision in Keyishian v. 
Board of Regents, which includes the most quoted statement about 
academic freedom: 
Our Nation is committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is 
of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers 
concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First 
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy 
over the classroom. 52 
Despite the robust academic freedom language in Keyishian, the 
Court based its decision on Fourteenth Amendment vagueness and First 
Amendment right of association grounds rather than the free speech 
grounds associated with the academic freedom of professors. 53 The case 
also specifically targeted a threat from outside the university-the 
governmental obsession with Communism in public employment during 
the 1960s. 54 It did not concern research or teaching, the core of the 
AAUP argument for academic freedom. 55 Consequently, the decision 
"left open the question of what exactly constituted academic freedom." 56 
The Supreme Court's vagueness toward defining a professor's 
academic freedom continued in Healy v. James, where the Court 
pronounced, "[W]e break no new constitutional ground in reaffirming 
this nation's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom." 57 This 
decision concerned the recognition rights of student organizations at 
public colleges and universities and did not concern professors. 58 
51. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). 
52. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 ( 1967). 
53. !d. at 599--{)00. 
54. !d. at 605. 
55. !d. at 606. 
56. Kate Williams, Loss ofAcademic Freedom on the Internet: The Fourth Circuit's Decision 
in Urofsky v. Gilmore, 21 REV. LlTJG. 493, 505 (2002). 
57. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972). 
58. !d. 
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Academic freedom for professors gains little ground from this decision. 
Perhaps Healy, rather than addressing lehrfreiheit (the educator's 
academic freedom) instead strengthened lernfreheit (the student's 
academic freedom). Once again, the Court did not clearly take a stand on 
academic freedom for educators. 
This lack of definition continued in Minnesota State Board for 
Community Colleges v. Knight59 despite Justice Marshall's assertio~ in 
the concurring opinion that "we have frequently affirmed that 'the 
intellectual ~ive and take of campus debate' is entitled to constitutional 
protection." 0 Marshall's comments on the intellectual give and take of 
the campus were incidental to the issue of whether a non-union teacher 
has a constitutional right to be heard in state mandated meet-and-confer 
sessions. Furthermore, Justice Brennan's statement in his dissenting 
opinion mirrored Keyishian: "This Court's decisions acknowledge 
unequivocally that academic freedom 'is a special concern of the First 
Amendment. "' 61 
Unlike the Healy and State Board decisions, Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire did not involve a professor but a one day guest lecturer who 
happened to be a Marxist journalist. 62 Despite its recognition as an 
academic freedom case, it is highly questionable whether this case is 
truly about academic freedom, which resides with the professoriate. In 
fact, the Court stated that the sole basis for the Attorney General's 
inquiry was to scrutinize Sweezy as a person, not as a teacher. 63 
Consequently, the issue in the case was about the extent of permissible 
legislative powers as exercised in the Attorney General's line of 
questions posed to Sweezy. While the plurality mentioned academic 
freedom, the Court did not decide the case on First Amendment or 
academic freedom principles. Instead, the decision, written by Chief 
Justice Warren, "was part of the plurality rather than the majority 
opinion, based on substantive due process, and intertwined academic 
freedom with political expression."64 
Outside of the high blown rhetoric surrounding the impact of Sweezy, 
the facts of the case and the specifics of the analysis, coupled with 
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion, 65 do little to support academic 
59. Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Calls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 ( 1984 ). 
60. !d. at 293 (Marshall, J. concurring). 
61. !d. at 296 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (Brennan, J. 
dissenting)). 
62. Wyman v. Sweezy, 121 A.2d 783, 788 (N.H. 1956). 
63. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,249-50 (1957). 
64. Zirkel, supra note 4, at 814. 
65. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence will be discussed infra note 72 and accompanying text. 
His comments form the foundation for the proposition that academic freedom is an institutional 
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freedom as an individual professor's right grounded in the First 
Amendment. Chief Justice Warren wrote "the right to lecture and the 
right to associate with others for a common purpose, be it political or 
otherwise, are individual liberties guaranteed to every citizen by the State 
and Federal Constitutions."66 This statement appears to grant a general 
right available to all citizens rather than a narrow right focused on the 
specific class of educators. 
While the plurality in Sweezy did provide some grand language about 
the importance of academic freedom, the language may restrict academic 
freedom to a protection from threats outside the institution. Chief Justice 
Warren wrote, "We believe that there unquestionably was an invasion of 
[Sweezy's] liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political 
expression-areas in which government should be extremely reticent to 
tread."67 
Although threats from outside the university arise in higher 
education academic freedom cases, they are rare in K-12 cases. Thus, 
Sweezy may not provide that much protection for public school teachers. 
In fact, the comments of the Court on academic freedom in its opinion 
are considered obiter dictum 68 -an observation or remark not necessary 
to the case or essential to its determination. 69 Thus, "the p 1 urality' s use 
of sweeping language provides no practical insight into the doctrine." 70 
It is instructive to note that Justice Frankfurter in his concurrence in 
the Sweezy decision chose a normative rather than a legal basis for 
discussing academic freedom. He concurred with the result of the 
plurality's decision but disagreed with their rationale. 71 It is also curious 
that the Justice chose a conference address given in South Africa for 
authority and did not use the position of the AAUP. Justice Frankfurter 
quoted this conference as follows in his concurrence: 
right. 
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is 
most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an 
atmosphere in which there prevail 'the four essential freedoms' of a 
university - to determine for itself on academic grounds who may 
teach, what may be taught, how shall it be taught, and who may be 
admitted to study. 72 
66. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 249. 
67. !d. at 250. 
68. HENDRICKSON, supra note 29, at 83. 
69. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 454 (6th ed. 1990). 
70. Williams, supra note 56, at 504. 
71. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,267 (1957). 
72. !d. at 263 (Frankfurter, J. concurring) (quoting THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH 
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As noted above, Justice Frankfurter's comments about speculation, 
experiment and creation while describing the work of the university, may 
not accurately describe the work of the public school. 
When viewed closely, the four cases cited above, Keyishian, Healy, 
State Board, and Sweezy, do not lend strong support to the proposition 
that academic freedom is a special concern of the First Amendment. In 
fact, these cases do not apply the First Amendment to the AAUP-
required adequate performance of professors. Keyishian was not 
concerned with a professor's teaching or scholarship. Students, not 
professors, were the focus of Healy. State Board's discussion of 
academic freedom was part of concurring and dissenting opinions. In 
Sweezy, the threat to academic freedom came from outside the academy 
and was not decided on free speech grounds. The academic freedom of 
professors receives little support from these four highly visible, major 
Supreme Court decisions. In fact, Justice Frankfurter's concurring 
opinion in Sweezy identifies academic freedom as a right of the 
. . . d h ~ 73 mstltutwn an not t e pro1essor. 
In Urofsky v. Gilmore, the Fourth Circuit took up the issue en bane 
raised by Justice Frankfurter as to where academic freedom resides. 74 
The Commonwealth of Virginia enacted "Restrictions on State Employee 
Access to Information Infrastructure" ("the Act"). 75 The focus of the 
law is to restrict state employees from accessin~ sexually explicit 
material on computers owned or leased by the state. 7 
The Act defined "sexually explicit content" to include: 
Content having as a dominant theme (i) any lascivious description of or 
(ii) any lascivious picture, photograph, drawing, motion picture film, 
digital image or similar visual representation depicting sexual 
bestiality, a lewd exhibition of nudity, as nudity is defined in § 18.2-
390, sexual excitement, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse, also 
defined in § 18.2-390, coprophilia, urophilia, or fetishism. 77 
The Act does not prohibit all access by state employees to such 
materials. 78 A state agency head may give permission to access such 
information if it is deemed by the agency head to be connected with a 
AFRICA 10-12 (1957)). 
73. !d. at 262-63 (Frankfurter, J. concurring). 
74. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000). 
75. VA. CODE ANN.§ 2.1-804 (Michie Supp. 1999). 
76. !d. 
77. VA. CODE ANN.§§ 2.1-804 et seq. (Michie Supp. 1999). 
78. Urolsky, 216 F.3d at 405. 
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bono fide research project or other such undertaking. 79 State employees 
remain free to access such information from their personal computers 
because the prohibition only applies to state owned or leased 
80 
computers. 
Six professors employed at various public colleges and universities 
in Virginia brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the Act. 81 
None of the six professors had requested or been denied access to 
sexually explicit material pursuant to the Act. 82 The plaintiff professors 
did not argue that they had a "First Amendment right to access sexually 
explicit materials on state-owned or leased computers for their personal 
use; rather [the professors] challenge[d] [the] restriction of access to 
sexually explicit materials for work related purposes." 83 
The Fourth Circuit asserted the following: 
Therefore, the challenged aspect of the Act does not regulate the speech 
of the citizenry in general, but rather the speech of state employees .... 
It cannot be doubted that in order to pursue its legitimate goals 
effectively, the state must retain the ability to control the manner in 
which its employees discharge their duties and to direct its employees 
to undertake the responsibilities of their positions in a specified way. 84 
As state employees, the professors were denied access to information 
to use at their discretion within the context of the university classroom. 
The ruling begs the question: What role does academic freedom play 
within the construct of employment speech? If academic freedom is a 
special type of speech within an academic setting, the question becomes: 
Who is the speaker-the employing university or the employed 
85 professor? 
The court analyzed the Supreme Court's major academic freedom 
cases and found that they supported a finding that academic freedom 
"inheres" with the institution and not the professor. 86 If Urojsky is 
79. ld. at 404. 
80. /d. at 405. 
81. Jd. at 404. 
82. Jd. at 405. 
83. !d. at 405-06 (4th Cir. 2000). 
84. !d. at 409. 
85. The Third Circuit in Edwards v. CalijiJrnia University of Penn.1ylvania, 156 F.3d 488,491 
(3d Cir. 1998), held that "a public university's ability to control its curriculum is consistent with the 
Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning the state's ability to say what it wishes when it is the 
speaker.'· The appellate court cited the Supreme Court's ruling in Rosenherger v. University of 
Virginia. 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1955), saying "When the University determines the content of the 
education it provides, it is the University speaking, and we have permitted the government to 
regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker." 
86. Weidner. supra note 22. at 263. ("Urof~ky's suggestion that academic freedom rights exist 
in the university as an entity rather than in individual faculty is contrary to the American tradition as 
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accurate, and academic freedom does reside with the public institution, 
what impact does this have on the academic freedom rights of public 
school teachers who work in a more centrally regulated environment? 
Ill. PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
As described above, professors have made a history of national 
policy pronouncements through the AAUP regarding the importance of 
academic freedom to the discharge of their duties. Public school teachers, 
however, have no such history. In addition, there are no majestic 
proclamations from the Supreme Court about the special nature of 
academic freedom in public schools. Instead, the justices seem reluctant 
to find a constitutional right of academic freedom for public school 
teachers, thus explaining their aversion to hear any such cases. 87 
Justice Brennan, who authored the memorable words in Keyishian's 
dissent describing academic freedom as a "special concern of the First 
Amendment," 88 also wrote a noteworthy opinion in Edwards v. 
Aguillard that at least brushed on academic freedom in the public 
school. 89 In response to the creation science versus evolution 
controversy, Justice Brennan wrote: 
[I]n the State of Louisiana, courses in public schools are prescribed by 
the State Board of Education and teachers are not free, absent 
pem1ission, to teach courses different from what is required. 'Academic 
freedom,' at least as it is commonly understood, is not a relevant 
. h' l)Q concept m t IS context. 
Justice Brennan's comment signals a reluctance of the Supreme 
Court to find a constitutional right of academic freedom for public school 
teachers, thus explaining its aversion to hear any such cases. 91 This 
decided lack of guidance from the High Court leaves lower courts, 
teachers, administrators, and school boards to winnow the chaff to find 
their own constitutional protections. Several possible reasons may 
articulated by the AAUP. It is, however, consistent with significant judicial and scholarly opinion."). 
87. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 113-14 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) ("I am. 
not ready to hold that a person hired to teach school children takes with him into the classroom a 
constitutional right to teach sociological, economic, political, or religious subjects that the school's 
managers do not want discussed."). 
88. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
89. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 ( 1987). 
90. !d. at 586 n.6. 
91. Sr!e also Epperson, 393 U.S. at 113-14 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) ("I am ... not ready 
to hold that a person hired to teach school children takes with him into the classroom a constitutional 
right to teach sociological, economic, political, or religious subjects that the school's managers do 
not want discussed."). 
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account individually and collectively for the absence of academic 
freedom in the public school classroom. This section will discuss the 
affect of the minor status of students, the control of curriculum through 
school boards, and the absence of a research and publication requirement 
for public school teachers as possible reasons. 
Society regards university students as adults with legal autonomy, 
while public school students are often minors. The German model 
incorporated by the AAUP accentuates this chasm. First, the concepts of 
lehrfreiheit and lernfreiheit involve a balance of rights and power 
between two groups of adults. Consequently, the law provides greater 
protection for public school students. 92 
Local school boards also limit the academic freedom of teachers 
because the boards function to protect public school students through the 
curriculum they allow teachers to use within the classroom. In fact the 
Second Circuit in a case regarding teacher dress asserted: 
[I]n secondary schools, it is true, the idea of academic freedom may be 
balanced to a degree by the countervailing interest of states, acting 
through local school boards, to inculcate basic community values in 
students who may not be mature enough to deal with academic freedom 
as understood or practiced at higher education levels. 93 
The courts are typically protective of the school board's authority to 
make curricular decisions based on the values of the communitl For 
example, in Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corporation, 4 the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the school board "has a 
legitimate, even a vital and compelling interest 'in the choice [of] and 
adherence to a suitable curriculum for the benefit of our young 
citizens. '" 95 
The school board has a further motivation in exerting curricular 
control over teachers due to high stakes testing. In universities, 
professors acting in concert, design and teach the curriculum. 
Increasingly however, professors who attempt to teach whatever they 
92. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (I 986) (for the proposition that 
students' constitutional rights are not co-extensive with adults); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 
629 (I 968) (in which the High Court held that minors have more restricted rights than those assured 
to adults). 
93. E. Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. E. Hartford Bd. of Educ., 562 F.2d 838, 843 (2d Cir. 1977). 
Public school students cannot be subjected to invocations and benedictions at high school 
commencement because of its coercive effect on them, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), but a 
similar challenge brought in a university commencement failed because adult students, the court 
asserted, have the maturity to choose among competing beliefs. Tan ford v. Brand, I 04 F.3d 982 (7th 
Cir. 1997). 
94. Zykan v. Warsaw Cmty. Sch. Co., 63 I F.2d I 300 (7th Cir. I 980). 
95. !d. at 1304 (quoting Palmer v. Bd. of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7thCir. I 979)). 
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want, departing from the approved curriculum, find they are not 
protected by academic freedom. 96 In contrast, the public school system 
places control over curriculum in the hands of the governing board. The 
board's interest likely resides in student test results, rather than in the 
classroom experience or the preferred learning objectives of the 
instructor. 
Public school teaching also does not lend itself to the German notion 
of academic freedom contained in lehrfreiheit because there is no 
essential component of knowledge production and publication in public 
school teaching. 97 Paragraph (a) of the 1940 Statement of Principles on 
Academic Freedom and Tenure With 1970 interpretative Comments 
reads in pertinent part, "Teachers are entitled to full academic freedom in 
research and in publication of the results .... " 98 The restrictions on a 
professor's academic freedom and work expectations apply to teachers in 
possibly a greater degree, thus further weakening the historical argument 
for a public school teacher's right of academic freedom. 99 
Therefore, history indicates that academic freedom, arguably enjoyed 
by college professors, does not appear to apply beyond the context of the 
university and into the public schools. In fact, it appears that public 
school teachers' academic freedom may share many of the AAUP 
restrictions applicable to professors, while having questionable claim to 
its protections. If the history of academic freedom provides questionable 
support for academic freedom for public school teachers, do courts 
96. See, e.g., Bishop v. Amov, 926 F.2d 1066. 1077 (lith Cir. 1991) ("The University's 
conclusions about course content must be allowed to hold sway over an individual professor's 
judgments."); Lovelace v. Se. Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 426 (1st Cir. 1986) (The First Amendment 
"does not require that each non-tenured professor be made a sovereign unto himself."); Saunders v. 
Reorganized Sch. Dist. No. 2, 520 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. 1975) (junior college teacher termination 
predicated on failure to follow the curriculum for English courses did not infringe constitutional 
rights). Conversely, Fossey and Wood point out: "(o]n the broad issue of a scholar's right to speak 
out on important social and political questions or to propound controversial positions on scholarly 
topics ... academic freedom and tenure are alive and well in the nation • s colleges and universities." 
RICHARD FOSSEY & R. CRAIG WOOD, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE, LEGAL ISSUES IN THE 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE 61 (Robert C. Clouded., 2004 ). 
97. See RichardT. De George, Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, 27 J.C. & U.L. 595, 
595-96 (200 I) ("The rationale for academic freedom is the preservation and development of 
knowledge. It is because the faculty has the appropriate knowledge in their respective fields that they 
need academic freedom. No one can know in advance where research will lead or what new 
knowledge will be. The best way to develop knowledge is to give those trained to discover it the 
freedom to do so." This begs the question of whether teachers are trained to discover knowledge or 
disseminate knowledge.) 
98. AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 28, at 3. 
99. See Tyll Van Gee!, The Prisoner's Dilemma and Education Policv, 3 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL 'y 30 I, 362 ( 1988) (questioning whether there is evidence that the framers of the 
Bill of Rights intended to protect academic freedom when there was no established system of public 
education in the original 13 states). 
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provide that support? 
The language of academic freedom for professors in higher 
education, as discussed above, is grand, evoking images of a robust right. 
The lower courts, on the other hand, often use more qualified language 
when applying academic freedom to public school teachers. The Third 
Circuit opined, "Although a teacher's out-of-class conduct, including 
advocacy of particular teaching methods, is protected, her in-class 
conduct is not." 100 A New York federal district court wrote, "Although 
teachers do not relinquish their First Amendment rights at the 
'schoolhouse' gate,' their constitutional freedom may be curtailed by 
school policies that are reasonably designed to adjust those rights to the 
needs of the school environment." 101 The Fourth Circuit, in the much 
discussed Boring v. Buncombe Board of Education case, in a closely-
divided decision held that a teacher had no constitutional right to control 
curricular decisions. 102 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit and Fifth Circuit, 
respectively, determined that the First Amendment does not authorize 
teachers to ignore curricula or directives of supervisors and that control 
of the public school curriculum had never been conferred on teachers. 103 
Although the language used by the courts in these cases varies, it is clear 
that academic freedom in the public school setting is limited. 
Some commentators have also been highly reluctant to ascribe robust 
academic freedom to public school teachers. The National School Board 
Association in an Amicus Curiae brief for a Colorado school district 
wrote, "[T]he court misses the point. Teachers do not have First 
Amendment rights to exercise state power in a manner of their own 
choosing through their teaching methodologies." 104 William G. Buss 
asserted that teachers "should receive only limited constitutional 
protection." 105 Countering both the argument for expanded academic 
freedom and the assertion that teachers possess an authoritative voice 
I 00. Bradley v. Pittsburg Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1171, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Miles v. 
Denver Pub. Schs., 944 F .2d 773 (I Oth Cir. 1991) (holding that teachers do not possess the right to 
academic freedom). For a discussion of Miles, see TODD A. DEMITCHELL & RICHARD FOSSEY, THE 
LIMITS OF LAW-BASED SCHOOL REFORM: VAIN HOPES AND FALSE PROMISES 149-64 (1997). 
101. Romano v. Harrington, 664 F.Supp. 675, 682 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). 
102. 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998). 
103. Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d !004, 1007-08 (7th Cir. 1990); 
Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989). 
104. Brief for Nat'! Sch. Bds. Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Bd. of Educ. v. 
Wilder, 960 P.2d 695 (Colo. 1998) (No. 97SC92292). 
105. William G. Buss, Academic Freedom & Freedom of Speech: Communicating the 
Curriculum, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 213, 219 ( 1999); see also William G. Buss, School 
Newspapers. Puhlic Forum. and the First Amendment, 74 IOWA L. REV. 505, 508 (1989) (Free 
speech "has never been understood to create a general right to use public property or resources for 
speech purposes"). 
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regarding what knowledge is of the greatest worth, Stephen Goldstein 
wrote: 
Although teachers' professional training and experience may give 
them special competency in matters of pedagogical methodology, often 
curricular decisions involve important value judgments concerning the 
proper allocation of societal resources or the aims sought to be 
accomplished by public education. These are ultimately political 
questions, which the expertise of teachers does not provide any special 
. 'd' 106 competency m provt mg. 
Thus, according to Goldstein, teachers cannot claim primacy in 
curriculum decisions. Goldstein's assertion, however, leaves questions 
regarding the protection of instructional decisions unanswered. 
Despite the dubious support by courts and commentators, there are a 
number of other court cases that consider academic freedom to be a 
vigorous, if not essential, right. For example, in an early and often quoted 
case involving a teacher's decision to have her high school English class 
read Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.'s Welcome to the Monkey House, the teacher's 
decision was protected as academic freedom. 107 The Sixth Circuit 
argued that teachers have academic freedom rights "to exercise 
professional judgment in selecting togics and materials for use in the 
course of the educational process." 1 8 Furthermore, a Texas federal 
district court offered a strong endorsement of academic freedom when it 
asserted, "[A] teacher has a constitutional right protected by the First 
Amendment to engage in a teaching method of his or her own choosing, 
even though the subject matter may be controversial or sensitive." 109 
Several commentators have asserted that teachers not only have a 
right to academic freedom, but that this right is necessary as a 
counterbalance to the government's message communicated through its 
public schools. Karen C. Daly calls for a recalibration creating a new 
balance between teacher and school board. 110 Her new balance 
encompasses the following propositions: (1) the need for classrooms to 
be free from indoctrination and teachers, through their constitutional 
right to free speech, are the best counterbalance to a school board's 
monopoly; 111 (2) a student's right to hear, when coupled with a teacher's 
right to speak, acts as a powerful antidote to overbearing administrators 
106. Stephen Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right o( Public School Teachers to 
Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1356 (1976). 
107. Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F.Supp. 352 (D. Ala. 1970). 
I 08. Fowler v. Bd. of Educ., 819 F.2d 657, 661 (6th Cir. 1987). 
109. Dean v. Timpson lndep. Sch. Dist., 486 F.Supp. 302,307 (D.C. Tex. 1979). 
110. Daly, supra note 13. 
Ill. !d. at 46. 
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and school boards; 112 (3) institutionalized protection for teachers in the 
form of a higher standard of proof is necessary when a school board 
action is in partial response to parental complaints about a teacher; 113 (4) 
a three level notice requirement is required with an accompanying sliding 
scale of review; 114 and (5) a judicial presumption that the decisions of 
teachers were reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns 
115 
completes the new balance. Another commentator offered the 
following view of academic freedom: "A teacher who is conveying either 
substantive knowledge about our system of government, or who is trying 
to inculcate its merit (even if through criticism), is conveying a message 
h d . ,116 t at eserves protectiOn. 
The issue of whether and to what degree academic freedom exists in 
public schools is an open debate. Despite somewhat cautionary language, 
the courts have upheld and even defended the academic rights of public 
school teachers, and commentators have reinforced those rulings by 
professing the notion that the public school teacher's right is an essential 
balance to state mandated curriculum. Still, while the courts have offered 
rulings and commentators have expressed their opinions, a voice that is 
missing is that of public school teachers. How do they conceptualize and 
actualize academic freedom within the walls of their classrooms? 
IV. TEACHER PERCEPTIONS OF THEIR ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
What are the perceptions of public school teachers regarding their 
academic freedom rights? To answer this second research question, a 
survey instrument was developed based on the analysis of court cases. 
Ninety schools nationwide (thirty each for elementary, middle, and high 
schools) were randomly selected from the nationwide population of 
public schools. The principal of each school received a letter requesting 
that the principal give a survey packet to the first five teachers listed 
alphabetically on the school roster. Each survey consisted of the research 
instrument, demographic information, letter of instructions, and return 
envelope. 
The survey asked four sub-questions in an effort to answer the 
research question: 
Is academic freedom important in providing a quality education to 
112. !d. at 3-4. 
113. !d. at 2. 
114. !d. at 53. 
115. !d. at 53-58. 
116. Merle H. Weiner. Dirty Words in the Classroom. Teaching the Limits of the First 
Amendment, 66 TLNN. L. REV. 597, 637 (1999). 
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students? 
Who has academic freedom? 
What constitutes academic freedom in the classroom? 
What is the strength of academic freedom? 
[2007 
A Likert type scale was used for twelve questions. The scale for the 
first ten questions was a forced choice in that there was no neutral point. 
In addition, two open response questions were asked. The Likert type 
questions used six points with no neutral, thereby creating a forced 
choice. The first three Likert style numbers (I, 2, & 3) range from 
"strongly disagree" to "disagree" and the second set of three numbers ( 4, 
5, & 6) range from "agree" to "strongly agree." Consequently, the poles 
are "Strongly Disagree" (1) and "Strongly Agree" (6). The larger the 
mean, the greater the agreement with the question stems. In addition, the 
survey included two open response questions: ( 1) What responsibilities, 
if any, attach to your academic freedom; and (2) How do you exercise 
your academic freedom (what activities constitute academic freedom)? 
A. Demographics 
The survey asked demographic information in order to gain a 
broader and deeper perspective of the sampling of teachers. As noted 
below, not all of the respondents filled out the demographic categories. 
Table 1 
Percentages of Teacher Respondents by Demographic Categories 
Demographic category Valid Percent of Respondents N (N=61) 
Gender 
Male 31.7% 19 
Female 68.4% 41 
Level Of School 
Elementary 37.9% 22 
Middle 32.8% 19 
High 29.3% 17 
Years of Teaching 
1-5 22.4% 13 
6-10 5.2% 3 
11-15 12.1% 7 
16-20 13.8% 8 
21+ 46.6% 21 
Location of School 
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Demographic category Valid Percent of Respondents N (N=61) 
Urban/Large City 11.5% 7 
Suburban/Medium City 26.2% 16 
Rural/Town 62.3% 38 
Sixty-one teachers responded to the survey. Caution must be 
exercised when generalizing from this data because of the low return 
rate. It is unknown if the respondents differ in some significant way from 
non-respondents. Missing responses were not included in the analysis 
and are not reflected in the percentages below. 
B. Data Analysis 
The issue of whether academic freedom is important to K-12 
teachers is central to the study because if it is not important, perceptions 
regarding it may be interesting but of little consequence. Teachers in this 
study overwhelmingly believe that academic freedom is important in 
providing a quality education to students. Approximately ninety percent 
(fifty-five respondents) of the respondents agree to strongly agree with 
the proposition. Of the six respondents who do not agree, three are 
elementary school teachers, one is a middle/junior high school teacher, 
and two are high school teachers. All six are female teachers and five of 
the six have taught for over twenty-one years. There are no other 
variables that indicate that there is a set of characteristics or responses 
that indicate a pattern as to why academic freedom is not perceived as 
important. 
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Table 2 
Is Academic Freedom Important in Providing Quality Education to 
Students? 
Mean % % 
(range= Strongly Agree 
1-6 Standard Disagree to Did not Question 
with no Deviation to Strongly Answer 
neutral) Disagree Agree (n) (n) 
1. Academic 
Freedom is 
important in 
providing a 4.82 1.06 
9.8% 90.2% 0 
quality (6) (55) 
education to 
students. 
Table 3 indicates to whom academic freedom applies. 
Table 3 
Who Has Academic Freedom? 
Mean % % 
(range= Strongly Agree 
1-6 Standard Disagree to Did not Question 
with no Deviation to Strongly Answer 
neutral) Disagree Agree (n) (n) 
2. Academic 
Freedom is a 
constitutional 5.0% 95.0% 
right of 4.78 0.99 I 
university/college 
(3) (57) 
professors. 
3. Academic 
freedom is a 
constitutional 4.33 I. II 
18.3% 81.7% 
I 
right of public (II) (49) 
school teachers. 
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Mean % % 
(range= Strongly Agree 
1-6 Standard Disagree to Did not Question 
with no Deviation to Strongly Answer 
neutral) Disagree Agree (n) (n) 
4. Public school 
teachers have the 
same academic 3.62 1.49 
60.0% 40.0% 
I freedom rights as (36) (24) 
professors. 
5. Public school 
principals have 
the same 
academic 4.15 1.27 25.0% 75.0% 1 ji-eedom rights as ( 15) (45) 
public school 
teachers. 
6. Substitute 
teachers have the 
same academic 
freedom rights as 
3.28 61.7% 38.3% 
the full time 1.39 (32) (23) 1 
teachers they 
replace. 
7. The academic 
freedom rights of 
public school 
teachers are not 
tied to 4.31 1.11 25.0% 75.0% 9 
employment; (13) (39) 
teachers retain 
their academic 
freedom 
The results indicate that the academic level in which teaching takes 
place, from substitute teacher to professor, influences the perception of 
the strength of the right to academic freedom. Only three teachers do not 
believe that academic freedom is a constitutional right of professors; the 
clear majority believe that professors possess such a right. However, 
teachers are less convinced that they possess such a right. They also 
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believe that their academic freedom is not the same as that possessed by 
professors. A t-test between responses to Questions 2 and 3 shows that 
the difference between the mean scores is significant (p<.OO I). In other 
words, the level in which the teaching takes place influences the 
perception of the strength of the right. 
Teachers at all three levels believe that the older the student taught, 
the stronger the right. When asked whether elementary, middle, and high 
school teachers have the same degree of freedom, forty-two point four 
percent answered "yes" while a majority of fifty-seven point six percent 
answered "no". The "no" respondents rank ordered the teaching level 
with the highest degree of academic freedom to the lowest. High school 
teachers received the highest percentage of first order places (eighty-one 
point three percent) with high school-middle school ~ elementary 
school, the preferred ranking (seventy-five percent). A Chi-Square (X2) 
analysis showed no significant difference between the responses of 
elementary, middle, and high school teachers. In other words, teachers at 
all three levels believe that the older the student taught, the stronger the 
academic freedom. However, the second highest ranking receiving 
twelve point five percent of the responses was elementary ~ middle -
high school. The most logical explanation is that the respondent reversed 
the order confusing the highest to lowest ranking. If this is true, then it 
confirms the conclusion above that a majority of the respondents believe 
that the older the student taught, the greater the academic freedom of the 
teacher. 
The respondent teachers believe, by a wide margin, (sixty-one point 
seven percent disagree to thirty-eight point three percent agree) that 
substitute teachers do not have the same academic freedoms as the 
teachers they replace (question six). If substitute teachers have the same 
certification requirements as full time teachers and they teach the same 
students in the public school as the full time teacher, why would they not 
possess the same constitutional freedom associated with teaching? 
However, if they do possess academic freedom, what ramifications are 
associated with the exercise of the right? Can they only exercise 
academic freedom when substituting and must their exercise reflect the 
position of the regular teacher for whom they stand in proxy? This raises 
interesting questions. Educational preparation, certification, and 
employment by a public school district, which appear to be prerequisites 
to academic freedom, may apply equally to substitute and full-time 
teachers, but can substitutes exercise the right equally and under what 
circumstances? If employment status is critical to academic freedom, do 
part-time teachers have reduced freedom? 
Question 7 further complicates the issue of who has academic 
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freedom. The majority of teachers (seventy-five percent) responded that 
teachers retain their academic freedom rights even when they are no 
longer teachers. This raises the question of whether or not teachers 
perceive academic freedom as tied to employment. Is academic freedom 
a right that is not contingent upon employment in public schools? If yes, 
can academic freedom be a "special concern" of the First Amendment if 
it is more generally diffused? How does a teacher exercise his or her 
academic freedom if he or she is not employed in a public school? It 
appears the teachers in this survey believe academic freedom truly is a 
constitutional right. If so, then once it is granted to a teacher, they cannot 
lose it, even if the unique relationship of employment triggered the right. 
By contrast, if teachers lose their academic freedom with their 
employment, is academic freedom an institutional right that is granted to 
those individuals the institution hires but withdrawn when the institution 
severs employment? If this is true, then the conclusion may strengthen 
the position of the court in Uroftky v. Gilmore that academic freedom 
resides with the public institution, not the teacher. 117 
Table 4 
What Constitutes Academic Freedom in the Public School Classroom? 
% 
Mean %Strongly 
(range= 1- Disagree to 
Agree 
Questions to Did not 
6 with no SD Disagree Strongly Answer 
neutral) 
Agree 
8. The academic 
freedom rights of 
public school 
teachers allow them 
4.16 28.3% 7!.7% to decide how to 1.02 I 
teach a lesson ( 17) (43) 
without interference 
from the 
administration. 
117. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401,409 (4th Cir. 2000). 
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% 
Mean %Strongly 
(range= 1- Disagree to 
Agree 
Questions to Did not 
6 with no SD Disagree Strongly Answer 
neutral) 
Agree 
9. Academic_freedom 
allows teachers to 
decide what shall be 73.3% 26.7% 
taught without 3.12 1.47 2 
interference from the 
(44) ( 15) 
administration. 
I 0. Teacher's 
speech, as part o{ 
instruction, can 
contradict the 3.39 57.9% 42.1% 
message of the 1.15 (33) 4 
school board and be 
(24) 
protected by 
academic freedom. 
II. Academic_freedom 
is intended to serve 
the personal speech 3.28 59.6% 40.4% 
interests o{the 1.19 
teacher not the 
(34) (23) 4 
interests o{the public 
school district. 
Restrictions on academic freedom received varying responses. 
Almost thirty percent of the respondents believe that academic freedom 
does not allow them to decide how to teach without interference from the 
administration (Question 8), and just over seventy percent believe that 
the administration has that right. The reverse is true when the teachers 
apply academic freedom to what shall be taught (Question 9). Just over 
one quarter of the teachers believe that they can control the curriculum. 
This question received the lowest mean score (M = 3.12) for the 
instrument. 
Similarly, teachers in the study find two other restrictions on 
academic freedom. The first restnctwn echoes Daley's thesis 
encouraging public school teachers to balance the school board . For 
example, teachers feel the pressure not to contradict the message of the 
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school board. 118 The second is that academic freedom serves the 
personal speech interests of the teacher and not the school board. The 
latter point addresses the issue of whose interests are protected by 
academic freedom. 119 Teachers do not appear to believe that academic 
freedom supports those actions removed from the primary task of 
teaching. There were no significant differences by gender, level, 
location, or years of service for any question in Table 4. 
A Pearson Correlation for Question 8 and Question 1 0 found a strong 
significant correlation (r = .53, p<.Ol). 120 Teachers who responded that 
academic freedom allows them to decide how to teach, tended to agree 
that a teacher's speech as part of instruction can contradict the message 
of the school board. The reverse is also true. 
Table 5 
What is the Strength of Academic Freedom? 
Me 
an Non- Very 
(ran No Question SD existent Weak Some Mod. Strong Strong 
ge= Ans (n) (n) (n) (n) (n) (n) 
1-6) (n) 
II. Circle the 
degree of 
strength or 
robustness of 4.3 18.3 33.3 
your academic 0 1.7% 0.0% 40.0% 6.7% 0.96 % % 
freedom (I) (0) (24) (4) I (II) (20) 
(instructional 
decisions). 
118. Daly, supra note 13. 
119. See DeMitchell, supra note 30. 
120. A Pearson Correlation is a measure of the relationship between two variables. A Pearson 
Correlation (called an r value) of 1.0 is a perfect correlation TIMOTHY C. URDAN, STATISTICS IN 
PLAIN ENGLISH (2d. ed. 2001). A weak correlation ranges between 0 to 0.2; a rr:)derate correlation 
ranges between 0.2 to 0.5; and a strong correlation ranges from 0.5 and above. !d. 
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Me 
an Non- Very 
(ran No Question so existent Weak Some Mod. Strong Strong 
ge~ Ans (n) (n) (n) (n) (n) (n) 
1-6) (n) 
12. Circle the 
degree of 
strength or 3.7 28.3 31.7 
robustness of 8 I 1.7% 26.7% 1.7% 1.03 0 % % 
your academic (7) (16) (I) I 
freedom (17) (19) 
(curricular 
decisions). 
As seen in Table 5 and confirmed by Question 11, instruction relates 
to academic freedom in the K-12 schools. Eighty percent believe their 
academic freedom rights are moderate to very strong when making 
instructional decisions. There were no significant differences between 
ratings by gender, level, location, or years of service. 
The more a respondent agrees that academic freedom is important to 
quality education, the more robust their academic freedom. A Pearson 
Correlation for Question 1 ("Is academic freedom important in providing 
a quality education to students?") and Question 11 found a significant 
moderate correlation (r = .44, p<.Ol). Interestingly, even though the 
mean score for the strength of academic freedom regarding curricular 
decisions is less robust than academic freedom for instructional 
decisions, Question 12 and Question 1 are also significantly moderately 
correlated (r = .48, p<.O 1 ). 
A significant moderate correlation between Question 8 ("The 
academic freedom rights of public school teachers allows them to decide 
how to teach a lesson without interference from administration.") and 
Question 11 exists (r = .47, p<.Ol). However, a low to moderate 
correlation (r = .280) significant at the p< .05 level exists between 
Question 9 (academic freedom allows teachers to decide what shall be 
taught without interference from the administration) and Question 12. 
In other words, the public school teachers in this research believe 
that they have academic freedom and that it is important to providing 
quality education. While they believe they have academic freedom, they 
do not believe that the right is as strong or of the same quality as 
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university professors. 121 They appear to have a tacit recognition that the 
structure of academic freedom depends upon the context in which it is 
exercised. Principals, who were most likely former teachers, retain their 
academic freedom rights, but teachers are unsure about whether 
substitute teachers, who act as their proxy, have the right. This raises 
interesting questions. Educational preparation, certification, and 
employment by a public school district, which appear to be prerequisites 
to academic freedom may apply equally to substitute and full-time 
teachers, but can substitutes exercise the right equally and under what 
circumstances? If employment status is critical to academic freedom, do 
part-time teachers have reduced freedom? 
The responding teachers recognize a difference in context for the 
robustness of academic freedom. Their decisions on how to teach a 
lesson receive greater protection than decisions regarding the curriculum 
or what shall be taught. It is unknown if professors make the same 
distinction. 
C. Short Answer Questions 
The survey instrument included a short answer section as well. Two 
prompts, developed from the survey questions, provided a deeper 
understanding of the instrument. The prompts included: ( 1) What 
responsibilities, if any, attach to your academic freedom? and (2) How 
do you exercise your academic freedom (what activities constitute 
academic freedom)? Researchers used an iterative process of reviewing 
each response in a search for themes that may exist in the responses. 
Researchers then developed and refined categories of responses. 
I. What responsibilities, if any, attach to your academic freedom? 
Forty-seven teachers (twenty elementary, fourteen middle, and 
thirteen high school teachers) responded to this prompt. The responses 
covered a series of topics, such as academic freedom must reflect the 
values of the community. 122 Three major themes emerged from the 
121. See Williams v. Vidmar. 367 F.Supp. 1265. 1272-73 (N.D. Cal. 2005) ("In summary, 
there is a difference between the free speech rights of a university professor when expressing his or 
her point of view in Sproul Plaza and those of a fifth grade elementary school teacher in expressing a 
point of view as part of classroom instruction."). 
122. See Cary v. Bd. of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 543 (10'" Cir. !979) ("It is legitimate for the 
curriculum of the school district to reflect the value system and educational emphasis which are the 
collective will of those whose children are being educated and who arc paying the costs."). The 
reponses covered topics such as "Academicfreedom restricted by Board policies, which reflect the 
desire ol the community"-fcmale suburban elementary school special education teacher with 
sixteen to twenty years of experience and "You need to be aware of the belief~. values, and moral 
stances ol your ol vour constituents "-male suburban middles school science/math teacher with 
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analysis of this question: (a) students stand at the center of academic 
freedom, (b) the classroom is not a private pulpit, and (c) institutional 
and governmental restraints on academic freedom. Each theme is 
discussed below. 
a. Students stand at the center of academic freedom. 
Possibly, in the absence of lernfreiheit and the requirements of in 
loco parentis, teachers in this study grounded their academic freedom in 
what is in the best interests of their students. This theme had the largest 
number of responses with twenty comments. There is an 
acknowledgement that students are a captive audience 123 and that 
124 
teachers must act as role models. Age level, developmental stage, and 
proficiency levels structure the exercise of academic freedom. 125 A male 
middle school science/math teacher in the southwest with twenty-one 
plus years of experience at an urban school summed up this concern: 
"A long with freedom come responsibilities to know where each student 
stands academically and where that student needs to be at the end of" the 
year. 1 have to know the student's learning style and teach and reteach to 
that style and ability. " A male middle school social studies teacher 
(eleven to fifteen years of experience, suburban school) captured the 
difference between professors and teachers: "You can't compare what a 
professor can say to provoke thought in an adult [versus} what should 
b 'd 1 d "126 not e saz to a st gra er. 
b. The classroom is not a private pulpit. 
Balance is a large part of this theme in thirteen responses. An 
English and humanities high school teacher in the rural northeast wrote 
eleven to fifteen years of experience. 
123. This concern is also expressed in the following: "Teachers are not hired and appointed to 
proselytize at public expense, disregarding the school board's policies. This danger is exacerbated by 
the fact that public elementary and secondary schools have a 'captive' audience, an audience that 
cannot easily escape a teacher's expressed values." MARK G. YUDOF ET AL, EDUCATIONAL POLICY 
AND THE LAW 250 (4th ed. 2002). 
124. Examples include "Teachers have the responsibility to be role models j(Jr good moral 
behavior and good citizenship" -rural female elementary school teacher with eleven to fifteen years 
of experience. 
125. This viewpoint is shared by a number of courts. See Webb v. Lake Cmty. Sch. Dist., 344 
F.Supp. 791, 799 (N.D. Iowa 1972) (while teachers have academic freedom rights, the states' 
"interest in limiting the discretion of teachers grows stronger . . . as the age of the students 
decreases.") This adds strength to the argument that the responding teachers noted-namely, that 
grade-school teachers have less rights than professors and that there may be a hierarchy of rights in 
the public schools (high, middle, and elementary). 
126. See Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1539 (7th Cir. 1996) (the need for 
a more structured environment is much greater with elementary school children). 
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that the responsibility of academic freedom requires teachers to "serve as 
an impartial and unbiased representative of the school district before 
classes of impressionable students. " An elementary school special 
education teacher with one to five years of experience wrote that to her 
the responsibility involved "[t}eaching a balance of information, 
minimizing personal bias as much as possible. " A female middle school 
science and math teacher with over twenty-one years of experience 
wrote, "I feel that in order to be responsible I must present a balanced 
l . h h l . if . "127 I dd' . esson-not one t at s ows on y one poznt o vzew n a 1t10n to 
striving for balance among competing views, the teachers were sensitive 
to their position, role, and power. A west coast elementary school teacher 
in a suburban school district noted, "School is compulsory, and I must 
. . I . .(; b l. ,r. , 128 not use my posztwn as a pu pzt.1or my e ze.~s. 
c. Governmental and institutional restrains on academic freedom. 
The third theme with twelve responses centered on institutional, 
local, state, and federal restrictions on academic freedom. This is a 
restraint that professors typically do not contend with except for those 
programs that lead to state certification or those seeking national 
accreditation. The responding teachers noted that they teach within a 
bureaucratic hierarchy that starts at the federal level with No Child Left 
Behind, then moves to the all important state standards, is mirrored in 
school district standards, and ends with compliance in their classrooms. 
A high school teacher noted, "We still need to follow guidelines and 
policies established by the State of New York and our local school board. 
Academic freedom operates with established boundaries. " 
The teachers who responded to this question understand that their 
academic freedom has restrictions. Their right is subordinate to the needs 
of students; balance is important if not imperative. Teachers do not 
possess a bully pulpit and should be careful not let their classroom 
become a private enclave for their speech. These teachers also 
acknowledge that others have control over what they teach. 
2. How do you exercise your academic freedom (what activities 
constitute academic freedom)? 
Forty-six teachers, twenty-one elementary, thirteen middle, and 
127. (Emphasis in original). 
128. This theme is similar to the holding in Palmer v. Bd. of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 
1979), in which the appellate court found that a kindergarten teacher did not have the right to 
disregard the curriculum on patriotic matters because the subject matter conflicts with her religious 
principles. 
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twelve high school teachers, responded to this question. One major 
theme emerged from the analysis: concern for the exercise of academic 
freedom. The major theme reflects Table 4. The responding teachers held 
the position that their academic freedom was primarily exercised in the 
instructional decisions and to a much lesser degree curriculum decisions. 
A female elementary school teacher with over twenty-one years of 
experience stated, "Academic freedom to me is freedom to teach course 
content without undue interference from any legal source (state, board, 
principal)." Another elementary school teacher from the west coast with 
one to five years of experience succinctly wrote "How I teach is the 
freedom I hold. "129 A male middle school teacher, also from the west 
coast, expressed the fit between curriculum and instruction in the 
following manner: 
Someone has said that teaching is the most private thing we do in 
public. I believe the state and district have responsibilities to dictate 
what needs to be taught. The educators need leeway (freedom) in 
deciding how to make the instruction happen. The instructional choices 
I make, within the confines of my responsibilities, constitute my 
d . ji d 130 aca emzc ree om. 
"My own style of teaching" and "responding to the needs of the 
students in the classroom " were comments that surfaced in several 
forms. Teachers are very aware of the importance of how they exercise 
their academic freedom. As one elementary school teacher wrote, "I do 
not, however, take this lightly. " 
One-quarter of the responding high school teachers (no middle or 
elementary school teachers) noted that teaching controversial subjects 
implicates academic freedom. There is starkness to their responses; no 
qualifiers are used or other contexts offered for application. One female 
rural social studies teacher with one to five years of experience wrote 
that "[b}y teaching controversial or unpopular topics" she exercised her 
academic freedom. We do not consider this a theme because of the low 
number of responses. However, we note it because only high school 
teachers consider teaching controversial subjects to be central to 
academic freedom. It is also interesting to note that teaching 
controversial subjects is part of the AAUP's Statement. 131 It could be 
that because high school teachers and professors work with older 
students they believe that controversy plays a part in their lessons, 
possibly because the subject matter has less absolutes and their students 
129. (Emphasis in original). 
130. (Emphasis in original). 
131. AM. Ass'N OF UN!V. PROFESSORS, supra note 28, at 3. 
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are expected to possess the maturity to handle the controversy. 
There was one respondent that differed significantly from the others. 
A male elementary school teacher in a rural school with over twenty-one 
years of experience wrote: "You don't. You keep your mouth shut and do 
what the district, state, and feds tell you. Our problem isn 't the principal, 
he also teaches, it is the district, state, and feds we struggle with. " 
Interestingly, this respondent strongly agreed that teachers have 
academic freedom and that the freedom to make instructional decisions is 
strong. However, this teacher considers academic freedom to be weak as 
applied to curricular decisions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The issue of academic freedom in public schools, in many wa~s, can 
be cast as a question of who is entitled to exercise state power, 32 and 
thereby determine what is taught within the classroom. Daly writes: "The 
policy question of who controls or should control what children learn is 
highly charged. Courts find it extremely difficult to balance the 
competing interests presented by school boards, school administrators, 
teachers, parents and students, all of whom have a valid stake in the 
educational process." 133 School boards are vested with state power to 
manage the schools. If academic freedom conflicts with the school 
board's policies and directives some mechanism must exist for a 
competing voice. Malcolm Stewart argues that in order to institute this 
First Amendment riBht in the public workplace three government 
subsidies are needed. 4 First, the teacher claims the right to be paid for 
all of his/her speech in the classroom. Second, the teacher requires the 
school district to provide a captive audience of school children to hear 
his/her speech. Third, "the teacher while defying the wishes of his[/her] 
superiors is asserting the right to added credibility by virtue of the 
imprimatur of state approval." 135 Daly agrees with this third point for 
supporting academic freedom while Stewart decries it. 
Academic freedom is an unusual right. While not all courts recognize 
that public school teachers possess academic freedom rights, 136 most 
recognize the right in some form. It is a right exercised by individuals 
132. Stuller, supra note 8, at 305. 
133. Daly, supra note 13, at I. 
134. Malcolm Stewart, The First Amendment, The Public Schools, and the Inculcation of 
Community Values, 18 J.L. & Eouc. 23 ( 1989). 
135. !d. at 62-63. 
136. See Miles v. Denver Pub. Schs., 944 F.2d 773,779 (lOth Cir. 1991) ("[T]he caselaw does 
not support [the] position that a school teacher has a constitutional right to academic freedom."). 
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who are employed by the state, which may be used to contradict or to 
support the employer's message. Classrooms are the place where school 
boards speak; the curriculum is their message. 
Public schools are considered a closed forum, 137 reserved for that 
speech or message that the state chooses to make through the adopted 
currciculum. Citizens do not have the constitutional right to enter the 
closed forum of the classroom to exercise their free SP.eech by countering 
the adopted curriculum or directing the curriculum. 138 In other words, 
the classroom is not a public street comer inviting all comers to speak. 
For example, the First Circuit opined, "If all parents had a fundamental 
constitutional right to dictate individually what the schools teach their 
children, the schools would be forced to cater a curriculum for each 
student whose parents had genuine moral disagreements with the 
school's choice of subject matter." 139 
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit addressing the issue of whether a 
classroom is a public forum allowing the teacher greater freedom to 
discuss non-school sponsored literature, held that a "junior high school is 
a nonpublic forum, which may forbid or regulate many kinds of 
speech." 140 
Yet within the closed forum of the classroom, academic freedom 
carves out a special place for a defined group to not only raise objections 
but to act on those objections. The contours of how a closed forum 
reserved for its owner's use, yet, is open to designated others, creates a 
policy problem of not only definition but also of application. Academic 
freedom may favor the speech of a few in a closed forum while the 
public speech of many must be directed to a political process with a 
separate forum, such as the give-and-take of public school board 
meetings or to the ballot box to elect trustees. Academic freedom is 
indeed difficult to define, yet its impact on educational policy can be 
considerable if teachers can tailor or modify the message of the school 
board. 
The teachers in this study recognize and reflect some of these tangled 
137. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 ( 1988) (holding that school 
facilities are closed forums). 
138. The classroom is considered a closed forum in that the school board reserves its use for an 
intended purpose-the teaching of the adopted curriculum. Chiras v.Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 618 (5th 
Cir. 2005), held that "the use of textbooks in public school classrooms is government speech and not 
a forum for First Amendment purposes." 
139. Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc., 68 F.3d 525,534 (1st Cir. 1995); see also 
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 235 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("'f we are to 
eliminate everything that is objectionable to any person or is inconsistent with any of their doctrines, 
we will leave public schools in shreds."). 
140. Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 9 F.3d 1295, 1302 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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situations. They clearly perceive that academic freedom exists in the 
realm of instruction. They are, however, conflicted as to what degree the 
freedom exists in the right to choose what to teach . Teachers, courts, and 
commentators recognize that academic freedom is not a boundless right; 
it has limitations and responsibilities. Many of their views and concerns 
are reflected in court decisions and by commentators. The views of 
teachers are important. Either a robust view or a more limited view of 
their academic freedom leads to professional action. Because teachers 
stand at the crossroads of education, their actions and perceptions matter. 
They are the engine of educational policy. 
